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We live in an age where our existence has been remarkably shaped by technology. 
However, as contemporary thinkers have elucidated, technology is not a mere sum 
of our tools. At a more profound level, technology forms an instrumental context that 
frames our relation to the world and to ourselves. Everything thereupon tends to appear 
merely as a means to an end. Countering the instrumentalistic tendencies of global 
technologization, this paper would like to ponder on the meaning of technology beyond 
mere tools. The core influence of this study is the thought of Martin Heidegger (1889-
1976) which reveals that both technology and art stem from ancient techne, our basic way 
to reveal reality through embodied praxis. However, 2500 years of Western intellectual 
history has rendered the instrumental meaning of techne – that is, the way we understand 
technology today as practical utilization of science – becomes far more dominant than 
the artistic or poetic one. It is the aim of this literary study to elucidate Heidegger’s dense 
phenomenological inquiry which reveals the dual meaning of techne: techne as technology 
and techne as art. Recovery of the forgotten poetic meaning of techne is crucial to counter 
instrumentalism that pervades art in our techno-scientific age.
Keywords: instrumentalism, embodied praxis, instrumental techne, poetictechne
IntroduCtIon
Nowadays, most of our lives take place in engineered environments, powered by 
electricity, equipped with lighting and water supply systems, air conditioners, 
audio-visual devices and so forth. As professionals from various fields including 
the art, our works rely on myriad of tools from computers and gadgets to art 
materials and instruments manufactured in large-scale industries. Indeed, for 
most of us as twenty-first century human beings, technology is like an oceanic 
habitat in which we make a living as if we were fish, rendering it inconspicuous to 
us due to its proximity, pervasiveness and ubiquity.
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In the modern art world, the invention of mechanical reproduction had ignited 
twentieth century visual art’s inclination towards formal abstraction, setting aside 
its age-old preoccupation with mimesis. However, under the urge of constant 
renewal while the modern art itself was heavily saturated with form-driven 
specimens, one of the most possible breakthrough pointed out by Arthur Danto 
(as cited in Braembussche, 2009) was achieved through a staunch conceptual 
approach, initiated by artists such as Marcel Duchamp and Andy Warhol with 
their found objects art (pp. 153-155, 157). From then on, there emerged an 
approach that shattered the traditional distinction between art and non-art, since 
under a conceptual credo, everything can be made a work of art. Contemporary 
installations are still echoing what the 1960s conceptual artist Sol LeWitt said 
about the art of his cohort: “When an artist uses a conceptual form of art, it means 
that all of the planning and decisions are made beforehand and the execution is a 
perfunctory affair. The idea becomes a machine that makes the art” (LeWitt, 1999, 
p. 12).
However, when the the concept and not the physically created or performed 
works takes over the center stage, consequently artwork becomes ‘dematerialized’ 
(Lippard & Chandler, 1999, pp. 46-50) and tends to appear as only a kind of 
message carrier or sign. Art’s preoccupation with its own sign-like functionality 
was attested by modern day employment of semiotics in art (Bolt, 2004, pp. 
116-117). Ironically, this ‘immaterial’ yet instrumentalistic conception of art also 
implies a ‘self-cancellation’ dilemma known as ‘the end of art’ put forward by 
figures such as Arthur Danto and Victor Burgin (Brand, 2000, p. 175). Judged 
only by its message-delivery function, art loses its inherent ‘material’ significance. 
Without purposely making the case worse, our technological predicament does 
not only affect our understanding of art, but of ourself. In today’s language, we 
even conceive ourselves instrumentally, namely as ‘human resources.’
The ‘superstar’ or ‘celebrity’ culture we often witness or experience in the art 
world, instead of a mark of individual liberation, is very likely a part and parcel 
of the ordering of those individuals within the production and consumption 
cycle of art as commodity. As cited in Bolt (2004), artists Josephine Starrs and 
Leon Cmielewski attested from their own experiences in the contemporary art 
scene that at first, celebrity artists themselves are regarded as products to be 
promoted in order to sell their artworks. Later when they have achieved enough 
fame and fortune, they can also be used as a tool to promote other products (p. 
57). Of course, to be circulated within this commodification cycle is not the same 
as endorsing it. In other words, we may still engage in such a circumstance from 
a critical standpoint. What is crucial here is rather that technology, as a global 
phenomenon, does shape our mindset in a seamless but profound manner, at 
which point our common understanding of technology as just a tool is clearly 
inadequate, even exhibiting the problematic itself, that is, instrumentalism.
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Speaking of the instrumentalism that pervades us at societal level, it is necessary 
to take a glance over some major studies of techno-industrial society, such as 
those of Max Weber and Critical theorists (Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, 
Habermas). Weber theorized that along with the modernization process in which 
techno-science played a constitutive role, there also came about the process of 
‘rationalization’ which characterized society. Premodern people were deeply tied 
to and motivated by traditions, while rationalization led to societal structures 
and behaviours that were governed solely by goal-oriented or instrumental 
rationality (Gane, 2002, pp. 15, 24-27). Jürgen Habermas who shared Weber’s 
concern asserted that the rationalization process had yielded ‘colonization of 
lifeworld by system.’ Our culturally rich and dialogical forms of life were more 
and more pervaded by instrumental logic of technocapitalistic system (Layder, 
2006, pp. 224-226). As contemporary sociologist George Ritzer attested, we can 
still witness Weber’s gloomy prognosis of modernity in an ever-increasing 
demand for calculability, predictability, control and efficiency over many aspects 
of our life today (Ritzer, 2010, pp. 16-17), e.g. through imposition of ‘measurable 
performance’ in education, ‘certification’ of profession, et cetera.
After seeing how profoundly technology has shaped us, we can now ask, how 
was that all possible in the first place? How could the human, the creator, become 
enslaved to his/her own creation, technology? Furthermore, is there still any 
significant place for art in the age where technology has become so dominant, 
and where its instrumental or goal-directed thinking seems to be the only logical 
way to think? Is there any meaning of art more than a message-delivery tool? It 
is no coincidence that Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), one of the most influential 
thinker of the twentieth century, occupied his life and work with fundamental 
questions such as the ones above. He does have some very fresh and original, yet 
deep and illuminating answers about the human condition, and its co-constitutive 
relationships with technology, and with art. 
To appropriate Heidegger’s enlightening answers, it is first required to grasp 
the basics of his pivotal approach, namely phenomenology. Accordingly, the 
first discussion in this paper is of Heidegger’s phenomenology, which revealed 
our basic constitution as being-in-the-world instead of subject vis-à-vis object. 
As being-in-the-world, we firstly engage reality immediately vested with our 
practical interest in a ‘mindless skillful’ manner (Dreyfus, 1991, p. 3), before we 
access them as objects of disinterested cognition. In other words, our most basic 
way to relate to reality occurs through embodied praxis or techne, not theoria or 
cogito as traditional and modern philosophy think. This topic will occupy the 
second part of this paper. However, techne, as Heidegger suggested, does not 
merely bring forth instrumental things (i.e. tools or technology) but also non-
instrumental yet meaning-bestowing artworks, as will be discussed in the third 
and final part. Here we discover the phenomenological significance of techne as 
art, that is, the disclosure of reality in a qualitatively meaningful way, in contrast 
to techne as technology that reveals reality solely as quantifiable function.
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HEIdEGGEr: tHE QuESt For tHE MEAnInG oF BEInG 
tHrouGH pHEnoMEnoloGy
Heidegger is well known for his life long quest for the meaning of being. Being, 
a traditional subject for ontology or metaphysics, is perhaps too abstract for us 
who are concerned about art and technology. However, what he means by being 
is neither an abstract entity that exists beyond perceptible reality, nor a special 
concrete entity among others, nor the sum of all entities, nor an aspect of entities 
(Carman, 2013, pp. 84-85). So, what is being and why it is important? Firstly, 
we should notice that Heidegger did not ask about ‘being’ per se but about ‘the 
meaning of being.’ As Carman noted, his question is actually “what does it mean 
to be” anything at all (p.85), as we often ask in sentences like “what does it mean to 
be a cat?” or “what does it mean to be a human being?” and so forth. This question, 
as simple or as superficial as it may seem, is actually a very fundamental yet 
very difficult to answer. Indeed, since Being and Time (1962), Heidegger decided 
to embark on his quest for the meaning of being (of many entities, i.e., human, 
natural, technological, or artistic entities) by firstly interrogating the only entitiy 
that concerns about the meaning of its own being, that is, us, the human being 
(pp. 32-35).
To be sure, Heidegger did not begin from square one since philosophical 
tradition has already provided some answers, but these he deemed to be a 
misinterpretation of the meaning of being. For Heidegger, the whole Western 
philosophical tradition has misinterpreted the meaning of being of either human or 
non-human entities as substance, i.e., the underlying ‘what-ness’ or essence of all 
entities that remains unchanged over time (Frede, 1993, pp. 43-46, 61). For Plato of 
the antiquity, what underlies all entities is their eidos or form, i.e., their perfect and 
permanent ‘blueprint’ which can only be accessed through theoretical inquiries. 
For the medievals, the underlying essence shared by all entities is ens creatum 
(created beings). It is under the influence of the progenitor of modern thinking, 
René Descartes, that we have been inclined to think that there are basically two 
kinds of substance: the mental that thinks and the material that occupies space 
(Guignon, 2005, p. 92). Today, it is still very common to assume ourselves to be 
a combination of non-physical mind and physical body, to see an artwork as a 
mixture of mental concept and physical medium, or a natural object as an entirely 
physical entity.
As a field of philosophical research, Heidegger did not find anything inherently 
wrong with metaphysics. However due to its historical sedimentation in 
language, substance metaphysics eventually becomes worldview, and in our 
time, it has been so tyrannical in framing our mindset that it “drives out every 
other possibility of revealing” (Heidegger, 1977, p. 27). One of the most harmful 
effects of Cartesianism is the reduction of the meaning of reality to mere objects 
to be dominated by man, the thinking subject. Beginning from the interpretation 
of her/himself as an entity that has a mental-thing ‘inside,’ entirely separated 
from material reality ‘outside,’ Descartes also initiated representationalism, that 
is, a belief that our most basic yet ultimate access to reality occurs through 
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mental representation or ideas inside our mind. This common metaphysical 
assumption has many peculiar consequences, for example, excessive theoreticism 
which presumes that all human ability consists of having a theory that can be 
transparently formalized (Clark, 2002, pp. 9-17, Dreyfus, 1991, pp. 1-6). Next, 
a sharp division between what is considered to be merely inside and what is 
truly outside, which in turn deems qualitative meaning as merely ‘subjective’ 
and quantitative empirical facts as ‘objective’ (Guignon, 2005, p. 92). Modern 
trivialization of art as merely subjective fiction vis-à-vis scientific knowledge as the 
one and only objective truth surely has Cartesianism as its culprit.
Finally, the Cartesian binary and its representationalism culminates in the age 
of technology when its bureaucratically controlled forms of life is embraced all 
over the modernized globe. Within this technologically ‘enframed’ world, human 
and non-human entities are even no longer appear as distinct subject and object 
but rather equally as ‘resources’ to be maximally utilized (Heidegger, 1977, p. 
18). As Iain Thomson (2011) explained, subject-object dualism precisely becomes 
technological enframing “when the subject objectifies itself – that is, when the 
human subject, seeking to master and control all aspects of its objective reality 
turns that modern impulse... back on itself” (p.58). Representational thinking, 
though initially was one of the most important self-discoveries which empowered 
human beings, has now led modern humanity to systematic domination of all 
entities including him/herself. To release ourselves from the grip of Cartesianism, 
Heidegger’s strategy in Being and Time was to show that the subject-object binary 
itself is a metaphysical construct that does not determine our basic ‘way to be’ in 
concrete life.
To let our way to be in concrete life show itself, Heidegger is indebted to Edmund 
Husserl’s phenomenology. Prior to Heidegger, phenomenology for Husserl was 
a rigorous self-examinaton of the inquirer’s own consciousness, with a goal of 
providing a firm epistemological basis for science, since all scientific knowledge 
is constituted in consciousness. Husserl’s aim was to achieve a comprehensive 
account of how knowledge is given to consciousness (Zahavi, 2003, p. 12). 
Husserl’s crucial finding is the intentional character of consciousness, which 
means, consciousness never occurs vacuously as if it is an empty container but 
always intending something, or directed towards an object outside of itself. We can 
see that intentionality already exceeds Cartesian sharp-dualism, since subject and 
object for Husserl are inter-dependent or presuppose one another (Moran, 2005, 
p. 50). Indeed, Husserl rehabilitates the role of the human subject in constituting 
knowledge, including the objective-scientific one.
Heidegger embraced Husserl’s intentionality, but at the same time saw that 
the latter was still trapped within Cartesian metaphysics by accepting pure 
consciousness of subject as a zero-point of intentionality. For Heidegger, there is 
no pure point to which we can anchor ourselves to get a neutral view of things. 
It is true that we could only begin from the first-person perspective or the ‘I,’ but 
for Heidegger, there is no evidence that there is any metaphysical substance, i.e., 
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subject or ‘mental-thing’ that underlies the ‘I’ in accessing reality. It is actually 
my prior involvement in practical affairs of my social milieu that gave me first 
access to things, other people, and myself (Guignon, 1993, p. 6). Heidegger named 
this co-constituve intentional relation between us and our socio-practical context: 
being-in-the-world, a relation that occurs at a pre-reflective level of engagement 
prior to conscious intending.
BEInG-In-tHE-World And TECHNE
To say that we exist as being-in-the-world does not mean that we merely occupy 
a spatial coordinate of planet earth which can be located by a GPS. Prior to the 
geometrization of space-time, the world we are being-in is a space of familiarity 
that envelopes our relations to things, people and ourselves in a pre-relective 
manner. It could be a world of family, a world of office workers, a world of 
academia, a world of art, and so forth. Each world serves as a backgound whole in 
which things and people including ourselves directly show up in the foreground as 
its meaningful parts. In our daily academic world for example, we find ourselves 
already coping with things (e.g., computer, printer and paper) in-order-to produce 
scholarly writings whereof words can be composed on papers towards sending it 
to a seminar, for-the-sake-of our own self-realization as academics. Things barely 
appear as meaningless and unrelated to each other and to us but always already 
within the world’s referential structure: … in-order-to … whereof … toward-which 
… for-the-sake-of-which … (Heidegger, 1962, pp. 91-122). 
In contrast to this basic human way of being as being-in-the-world, the Cartesian 
subject merely occupies a uniform geometric space where she/he firstly 
encounters things as meaningless objects for her/his bare perception. Things 
become meaningful only through subjective value-predication or arbitrary 
conceptual imposition inside the mind, explaining why Cartesianism may lead 
us to crisis of meaning. Replacing the concept of subject, Heidegger’s German 
neologism for the human entity whose basic way to be is being-in-the-world 
is Dasein. Translated literally, Dasein means being-there, which is actually 
Heidegger’s designation for an a-priori human ‘openness’ towards worldly 
contexts instead of being enclosed within itself as an ego (Dreyfus, 1991, p. 13). 
As discussed earlier, Cartesian ego is actually a metaphysical (i.e. hypothetical) 
substance which is conceived to be entirely self-sufficient and isolated from any 
worldly context. While as Dasein, we and the world basically constitute each 
other from the very start in a part-whole relationship.
Self and world belong together in a single entity, the Dasein. Self and world are 
not two beings, like subject and object, or like I and thou, but self and world are 
the basic determination of the Dasein itself in the unity of the structure of being-
in-the-world. (Heidegger, 1988, p. 297)
One can indeed question the a-priori validity of being-in-the-world in disclosing 
entities as already familiar to us, for does one not become familiar with things by 
recognizing them in cognition one after another? But if we begin our existence 
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from the position of a worldless subject who basically accesses things through 
bare cognition, then we should begin by merely perceiving things as meaningless 
objects. Computers, printers, stack of papers, et cetera in our office should firstly 
be perceived as mere box-shaped objects of assorted sizes, colors and textures 
without any significance, then we must attach meaning to each of them in a 
piecemeal manner, followed by relating each thing to the others until it forms 
a coherent whole, then we know what to do amids them. In fact, our daily 
encounters with things never proceed in a such a way. We ‘proximally and for the 
most part’ find ourselves already coping with things we are already familiar to, in 
order to pursue the socio-practical goals we are already aiming towards.
For us whose constitution is being-in-the-world, things within the world are 
thereby initially revealed as “ready-to-hand” or equipmental things through daily 
coping, prior to their disclosure as “present-at-hand” or neutral objects for bare 
perception as Descartes suggested (Heidegger, 1962, pp. 97-98). This praxical 
yet embodied disclosure of reality as equipmental things does not apply only to 
man-made artifacts but to nature. “The wood is a forest of timber, the mountain 
a quarry of rock; the river is water-power, the wind is wind ‘in the sail’” (p. 100). 
It is only in total absence of Dasein (which is impossible since we in fact, are) 
or when our initial coping runs into breakdown that equipmental things begin 
to occur as neutral objects for disengaged cognitive perception. For Heidegger, 
this equipmental breakdown is the origin of theoretical attitude, which implies that 
human praxis never emerges from some previously established theories. It was 
philosophy since Plato that has misinterpreted humanity’s prime comportment 
towards reality as cognitive or theoretical in nature. However, Heidegger 
discovered that the Pre-Socratic before Plato has recognized this praxical yet 
axiomatic way to reveal the real in their concept: techne, the etymological source 
of today’s term technology. In the introduction to Heidegger’s The Question 
Concerning Technology (1977), Leavitt explained this broad sense of techne. 
Techne was a skilled and thorough knowing that disclosed, that was, as such, 
a mode of bringing forth into presencing, a mode of revealing. (p. xxv)
Here, Heidegger has no other intention than implying that humanity and 
technology co-constitute each other from the very beginning, which means 
they both are each other’s perpetual condition for being what they are. This co-
evolution between human and technology also means that we can never escape 
technology, since our very being is already technological from the start. Stated 
differently, technology is never merely the total sum of artifacts ‘out there,’ 
but rather, the artifact itself is already an outcome of our ‘technological’ way 
of comporting ourself embodiedly towards the world (i.e. techne). Even theoria 
which became axiomatic for Western humanity since Plato and Aristotle is 
regarded by Heidegger as emerging from both thinkers’ unrealized projection of 
technological attitude towards the cosmos as whole. Zimmerman (1990) glosses 
this technologically-contaminated inquiry of Plato and Aristotle into the nature of 
reality as “productionist metaphysics.”
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The metaphysical schemes of Plato and Aristotle, Heidegger argued, were 
based on the view that the structure of all things is akin to the structure of 
products or artifacts. Aristotle’s metaphysics, for example, is ‘productionist’ 
insofar as he conceived of all things, including animals, as ‘formed matter’. 
The most obvious example of such ‘formed matter’ is the work produced 
by an artisan who gives form to material. Plato and Aristotle seemingly 
projected onto all entities the structure of artifacts. (p. 157)
This short glimpse into Heidegger’s deep vision about technology more or less 
illustrates why Western culture for him inevitably culminates in the technological 
era, that in turn it becomes a threat to humanity through its pervasive 
instrumental mindset.
However, if technology itself is nothing but the basic co-constitution of our own 
being, then the big question is how can we ever release ourself from the grip of 
instrumentalism that Heidegger himself despises? It turns out that Heidegger 
(1977) also indicated that in ancient times, techne did not only disclose reality 
instrumentally, but also poetically (i.e., as artworks).
Once that revealing that brings forth truth into the splendor of radiant 
appearing also was called techne. Once there was a time when the bringing-
forth of the true into the beautiful was called techne. And the poiesis of the 
fine arts also was called techne. In Greece, at the outset of the destining of the 
West, the arts soared to the supreme height of the revealing granted them. 
They brought the presence [Gegenwart] of the gods, brought the dialogue of 
divine and human destinings, to radiance. And art was simply called techne. 
(p.34)
Simply stated, the only way to counter-balance the instrumental side of techne for 
Heidegger is through techne itself, though its non-instrumental side, that is, art.
tECHnE AS tECHnoloGy And tECHnE AS Art
To be able to experience art as a counter balance to technological frenzy, we 
should pay attention to how Heidegger differentiate the phenomenality of 
equipments and artworks. As mentioned earlier, equipmentality of things is 
disclosed at the same time we engage them through daily coping. However, 
equipmental things have a very peculiar phenomenality: they are disclosed in 
a transparent manner. This transparency becomes obvious if we take examples 
of our ‘nearest’ equipments such as clothes, shoes, or glasses. When we use 
these proximal items, we don’t pay attention to them but instead to the goal of 
our practice. We are busy reading books by wearing glasses, while the glasses 
themselves becomes barely noticable. This transparency is also tied to the fact 
that any equipment is disclosed within the referential structure of the world 
as previously discussed. A hammer, for example, never exists individually but 
always in its reference to nails, then nails refer to woodboards, woodboards 
to furniture, furniture to houses, houses to districts, districts to cities, et cetera, 
until it forms our world as an ‘equipmental totality,’ which is also transparent 
to us insofar as we immerse ourselves in it in daily life. A city as an equipmental 
whole remains inconspicuous until a breakdown such as electricity failure occurs, 
21
Ferdinand Indrajaya. Art as the Manifestation of Embodimentd. rio Adiwijaya, yasser izky Techne as Technology a d Techne as Ar
modifying its previous transparency into an explicit availability (i.e. natural 
object) for our rational scrutiny.
In the early parts of The Origin of the Work of Art (1975), Heidegger begins to 
describe initial differences between equipmental things and artworks, that the 
latter do not need equipmental breakdown to explicitly announce themselves. It 
could be related to art’s ‘thingly character,’ eg. “colored in painting” or “sonorous 
in musical composition” as Heidegger begins to ponder (p. 19). However, this 
attempt to capture the phenomenality of artwork from its mere materiality ended 
in the need to add immaterial values or concepts to that material thing for it to be 
valued as art. This is precisely the way binary substance metaphysics frames our 
basic understanding of everything, the way that Heidegger expects to overcome. 
Returning to his phenomenological position that things are initially revealed 
as equipmental things and not mere things, Heidegger in The Origin decides to 
directly compare phenomenal differences between an equipmental thing and 
a painting of equipment, in his case a pair of farmer’s shoes and Van Gogh’s 
painting of shoes. The comparison itself is carried out in a very unorthodox 
manner, in which Heidegger attempts to redescribe real farmer’s shoes (which are 
of course unavailable for Heidegger at the time he visits the gallery where Van 
Gogh’s painting is displayed), with the help of the painting (p. 33). This sequential 
and careful reading of The Origin of the Work of Art is necessary to avoid the false 
impression that Heidegger is attempting to interpret the content of Van Gogh’s 
painting.
Before attending to the painting, Heidegger already brings an example, that is, 
the real shoes of a female farmer, probably from rural Southwest Germany, the 
same area where Heidegger lived. Heidegger begins by describing the transparent 
phenomenality of real shoes from within the world of the farmer herself.
The peasant woman wears her shoes in the field. Only here are they what 
they are. They are all the more genuinely so, the less the peasant woman 
thinks about the shoes while she is at work, or looks at them at all, or is even 
aware of them. She stands and walks in them. That is how shoes actually 
serve (p. 33).
The only way for the shoe to be individuated from its world as equipmental 
totality in Being and Time is through equipmental breakdown, which then modifies 
the transparent phenomenality of equipment into an explicit object. Now as 
Heidgger moves his attention away from real shoes of the farmer to the painting 
of Van Gogh, suddenly he sees:
From the dark opening of the worn insides of the shoes the toilsome tread of 
the worker stares forth. In the stiffly rugged heaviness of the shoes there is 
the accumulated tenacity of her slow trudge through the far-spreading and 
ever-uniform furrows of the field swept by a raw wind. On the leather lie the 
dampness and richness of the soil. Under the soles slides the loneliness of the 
field-path as evening falls. In the shoes vibrates the silent call of the earth, its 
quiet gift of the ripening grain and its unexplained self-refusal in the fallow 
desolation of the wintry field. This equipment is pervaded by uncomplaining 
anxiety as to the certainty of bread, the wordless joy of having once more 
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withstood want, the trembling before the impending childbed and shivering 
at the surrounding menace of death (pp. 33-34).
Clearly Heidegger is not interpreting the content of Van Gogh’s painting, but 
rather speaking about the shoes of the German farmer in the way he describes 
equipmental things in Being and Time. But this time he does not describe it directly 
but through the facilitation of Van Gogh’s painting. Heidegger indeed sees the 
difference between seeing the shoes directly and indirectly (through painting). 
Directly seen, real shoes appear as something ready to wear. If we notice some 
worn marks on the leather, it is only a sign for us to check whether the shoes need 
a maintenance or a repair. In short, it is all about the functionality of the shoes. 
But seen through the painting, it now appears that those worn shoes do not only 
belong to an equipmental context, but to ‘earth,’ the source of its poetic meaning 
beyond mere funtionality (Kockelmans, 1986, 131-132). From this illuminative 
power of painting then Heidegger concludes that a simple mimetic painting 
of Van Gogh’s pair of shoes neither merely represents a real object, nor merely 
expresses its painter’s intention, but reveal ‘the truth’ of reality (Heidegger, 1975, 
p. 35), that is, the inherent and qualititative meaning of things, in this case, a pair 
of shoes.
The ordinary significance of equipment is usually its ‘usefulness’ (p. 34) or 
functionality. Here, we should remember that for Heidegger’s phenomenology, 
every equipmental thing always refers to another equipmental thing, e.g., hammer 
refers to nails, nails to woodboards, woodboards to furniture and so on until they 
form an equipmental totality. Every equipmental thing therefore does not have 
any intrinsic significance, since it is determined by its function to fulfill certain 
extrinsic goals, which in turn refer to other extrinsic goals, and so on ad infinitum. 
In modern age, the functionality of equipment is determined quantitatively, e.g., 
by measuring its efficiency in fulfilling its function. Less efficient equipment 
is usually deemed to be obsolete and disposable. However, the worn marks 
on the shoes in Van Gogh’s painting which have nothing to do with functional 
decay, reveal an even more original yet qualitative meaning of equipment, that 
is, its ‘reliability’ (pp. 34-35). When we wear out our equipment, this ‘reliability’ 
is indeed inconspicuous. Only through the illumination of the painting, it is 
revealed that the worn marks are a sign that the shoes have always been relied 
upon, in Heidegger’s case, by the farmers in roaming the earth. Earth is nature’s 
materiality that sustains the world, but remain excessive or lies outside its horizon 
of practical inteligibility (Polt, 2011, p.38, Mitchell, 2010, p.10). Earth as ‘excess’ 
that is resistant to the world’s daily instrumental logic can be seen in Heidegger’s 
lyrical description about nature that gives harvest (instrumentality) but also 
scarcity (resistance). While there should be earthy elements in every equipment, 
earth only appears conscpicuously through artworks due to its non-instrumental 
or poetic treatment of materiality. “The work lets the earth be earth” (p. 46).
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In The Origin, Heidegger further discusses the difference between the instrumental 
and poetic treatment of materiality, or between instrumental and poetic techne. In 
the citation below, Heidegger refers to his second example of artwork, that is, a 
Greek temple that due to its monumental nature is more capable of demonstrating 
an artwork’s capacity for opening up a cultural world.
In fabricating equipment – e.g., an ax – stone is used, and used up. It 
disappears into usefulness. The material is all the better and more suitable 
the less it resists perishing in the equipmental being of the equipment. By 
contrast the temple-work, in setting up world, does not cause the material 
to disappear, but rather causes it to come forth for the very first time and to 
come into the open of the works’s world. The rock comes to bear and rest and 
so first becomes rock; tones to sing, colors to glow, tones to sing, the words to 
speak (p. 46)
For Heidegger, artworks as intentional things, that is, things that have a co-
constitutive relation with us, originally emerged through our own poetic 
treatment of materiality. But in our techno-scientific age, art tends to become 
more and more dematerialized and overly conceptualized. Heidegger’s ouevre 
could remind us that poetic embodied praxis which does not merely treat things 
abstractedly and instrumentally is in fact the condition of possibility of the 
emergence of something that we can call art at all. As something that is non-
instrumental in nature, an artwork is indeed something that can still meaningfully 
speak to us about the intrinsic and qualitative significance of many things. Even 
our ‘tragic’ mortality can be brought forth in a beautiful way, only through the 
poetic nature of art. Speaking of mortality, the technological mindset is of course 
incapable of conceiving it as more than a ‘functional failure.’
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